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Tiivistelmä: 
Tässä  tutkielmassa tarkastellaan Yleissopimus kansainvälistä tavaran kauppaa 
koskevista sopimuksista (CISG) 79 (1) –artiklan soveltamista tilanteessa, jossa 
artiklan mukaisesti sopijapuoli ei ole vastuussa velvollisuutensa täyttämättä 
jättämisestä kun hän näyttää, että se on johtunut hänen vaikutusmahdollisuuksiensa 
ulkopuolella olevasta esteestä jota hänen ei kohtuudella voida edellyttää ottaneen 
sopimusta tehtäessä eikä välttäneen tai voittaneen estettä tai sen seurauksia ja este  
on sopimuksen täyttämisestä johtuvien kustannusten nousu. 
 
Tutkielmassa tarkastellaan artiklan asettamia yleisiä edellytyksiä vastuusta 
vapautumiselle, artiklan tulkintaa ja lopuksi erityisesti vastuusta vapautumista 
kustannusten noususta johtuvan esteen vuoksi sekä tähän liittyvää kohtuusharkintaa 
sekä verrataan artiklaa Suomen kauppalain vastaaviin säädöksiin. 
 
Juuri kohtuusharkinta nostetaankin tutkielmassa tärkeäksi tekijäksi arvioitaessa 
vastuusta vapautumisen edellytyksiä. Kohtuusharkintaan etsitään työkaluja muun 
muassa CISG:n taustalla olevista oikeusperiaatteista sekä oikeuskäytännöstä. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Contracts are concluded to be kept. Any two parties operating in good faith mean to 
fulfill the contract to which they have committed, and parties to contracts in 
international trade are generally considered equals. Most of the time things go as 
planned, but in spite of the best of intentions trouble arises at times. 
 
Even in difficulties parties can generally come to an agreement as to how to deal with 
the situation since creating and maintaining good business relationships and a 
reputation as a pleasant, flexible trade partner is in every reasonable business 
operator’s interest. However, sometimes a dispute arises, and especially if the 
parties have not prepared for difficulties when in the drafting phase of the contract 
between them, there is a need to rely on international trade law. 
 
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG) is an international sales law aimed at managing these situations. Since 1980 
it has served as a tool to unify international sales legislation.  
 
When it comes to this or any other unification pursuit including the correct application 
of the CISG, the homeward trend is a major threat. The homeward trend means the 
natural tendency of law professionals to look at any given situation from the point of 
view of their national legal culture. Even clearly written legislation cannot free the 
global legal community from the homeward trend’s influence as concepts and terms 
often get interpreted to be similar to those of national legal cultures even when they 
are not. Another problem altogether is that an international legal instrument such as 
the CISG is most often the result of lengthy negotiations, a compromise, and as 
such, relatively vaguely worded. This thesis aims to contribute to the 
acknowledgement of the danger of the homeward trend, and therewith, a more 
correct interpretation of the CISG. 
 
2 
 
 
 
When it comes to international commercial disputes, CISG article 79 (1) governs 
situations, where an unforeseeable difficulty, an impediment, has arisen and the 
impediment is affecting a party of a contract who is unable to reasonably overcome 
the impediment. When the requirements set by this article are met, the party is not 
liable for damages for its failure to fulfill the contract. An impediment can be physical, 
such as a war or a trade embargo, or economic, which means it is a difficulty that is 
caused by an increase in the costs of fulfilling a contract. The aim of this thesis is to 
provide an analytical view of the requirements set out by CISG article 79 (1) for an 
exemption from damages due to an economic impediment.  
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2 AVOIDING THE HOMEWARD TREND 
 
2.1 General guidelines for interpreting the CISG 
 
General guidelines for interpreting the CISG are written in CISG article 7: 
 
“(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its 
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its 
application and the observance of good faith in international trade. 
 
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are 
not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general 
principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in 
conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private 
international law.” 
 
 
The second part of this article clearly stipulates that national laws are the last resort. 
When it comes to matters not specifically determined in the CISG, in other words 
gaps in the CISG, they are to be either filled with the underlying principles of the 
CISG or by determining an applicable national law by using the rules of private 
international law, and applying that law. The wording of the article clearly states that 
the underlying principles are to be turned to first, and a national law is only to be 
applied if there are no general underlying principles of the CISG to be found1. 
 
This distinction is often called differentiating between internal and external gaps in 
the CISG. Internal gaps are the matters that are governed but not expressly settled 
by the CISG, and they are to be resolved by using the underlying principles of the 
                                                 
1
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CISG2. An example of an internal gap is the reasonability standard: several articles of 
the CISG call for a reasonability assessment, but the more precise definition and 
criteria is not spelled out.  
 
External gaps are matters, which are not covered by the CISG at all. Rules of private 
international law is used to find the applicable national law to be used to fill external 
gaps3. An example of an external gap is the issue of contract validity, which is 
specifically left outside of the scope of the CISG4. 
 
Absent from this last resort recourse to an applicable domestic law, it is important 
that the CISG is interpreted autonomously. In addition to the CISG’s language itself, 
the CISG’s legislative history, international scholarly writing, and court and arbitral 
decisions can be used as non-binding tools to help with the interpretation.  
 
The UNIDROIT Principles have been claimed to be “international commercial 
practice”5 and, thereby, applicable as a gap filling tool to use in the interpretation of 
the CISG6. This can be seen as being in line with CISG article 7 (1). However, when 
it comes to gap filling, priority should be given to the wording of CISG article 7 (2) 
and the interpreter should turn to either the underlying principles of the CISG or 
applicable national law depending on whether the gap is an internal gap or an 
external gap. The UNIDROIT Principles, while widely accepted, are not derived from 
the CISG, and when searching for the underlying principles of the CISG, the 
convention itself and legal material directly related to it, such as the CISG’s 
legislative history, international scholarly writing, and court and arbitral decisions on 
the CISG should be used to find the underlying principles as previously mentioned. 
Parties always have the right to include the UNIDROIT Principles in the contract 
                                                 
2
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between them, and if they have chosen not to do so, party autonomy must be 
respected. 
 
2.2 The homeward trend 
 
Homeward trend is a term used to describe the natural inclination of law 
professionals to interpret new or foreign legal instruments from the point of view of 
their national legal system. This constitutes a considerable threat to all unification 
efforts, including the CISG. The main advantages of international law or legislation, 
predictability and international neutrality, disappears if the interpretation of said law or 
legislation is dependent on the country, in which the interpreter has received their 
legal education or acted as a legal professional. This would also lead to an increase 
in forum shopping when a party would have the opportunity to seek out legal 
professionals, whose nationally colored view would lead to a favorable interpretation 
for said party. This is counterproductive as one of the reasons behind creating the 
CISG was an aim to reduce forum shopping7. 
 
A blatant example of the homeward trend is US courts’ use of case law on the 
Uniform Commercial Code, i.e. US trade law, when interpreting the CISG8. For 
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has found, that: 
 
“Caselaw interpreting analogous provisions of Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (“UCC”), may also inform a court where the language 
of the relevant CISG provisions tracks that of the UCC.”9 
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This view completely fails to recognize that the language and concepts of the CISG 
are not interchangeable with any national law, and because of this it would be a 
gamble to blindly assume that the actual contents of a CISG article and a national 
law provision were uniform even if the wording of these provisions were exactly the 
same10. It is also in direct violation of CISG article 711. 
 
Fortunately, many courts are aware of the homeward trend and abstain from trying to 
interject the concepts and interpretation style of their national legal systems into the 
CISG12. 
 
It is of utmost importance that attempts to introduce foreign elements to the CISG, or 
any international legal instrument, are not successful. Parties to a contract are 
already free to exclude the CISG or derogate from or vary the effect of any parts of it 
(apart from article 12)13 if they so choose. An important underlying principle of the 
CISG and a clear expression of its international character, the need to promote 
uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade is 
party autonomy. Courts and tribunals are obliged to honor it and keep to applying the 
CISG autonomously, only modified by the contract between the parties. 
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3 ECONOMIC IMPEDIMENT IN THE SCOPE OF CISG ARTICLE 79 (1)  
 
CISG article 79 (1) reads:  
 
“A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he 
proves that the failure was due to an impediment beyond his control and 
that he could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment 
into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have 
avoided or overcome it or its consequences.” 
 
 
The article clearly describes exceptional circumstances. When the impediment 
mentioned is caused by economic reasons, the situation must be especially 
exceptional. A brief look at the typical situations when a breaching party has claimed 
to be exempted under this article is in order to ground further analysis of exempting 
circumstances in reality. 
 
3.1 Grounds for damages in situations associated with economic impediments 
 
One of the two most typical situations where a party attempts to be exempted from 
liability for damages due to an exempting economic impediment under CISG article 
79 (1) is a situation of an increase in the market price of the sold goods after the 
conclusion of a contract. In this situation the seller then has refused to supply goods 
at the price stipulated by the contract and the buyer has claimed damages for the 
price difference between the contract price and the price the buyer has paid in order 
to obtain substituting goods from another source,14 for the price difference between 
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the contract price and current price for similar goods,15 or reimbursement for the 
value of undelivered goods16.  
 
The opposite situations have occurred in an eight-year framework agreement when a 
buyer has refused to accept goods due to the buyer’s customer’s decision to reduce 
the price it would pay for the goods, and a one-time contract as the buyer has simply 
refused to accept goods due to a drop in market price. In these cases, sellers have 
been awarded damages for storing the undelivered goods and lost profits due to the 
buyer’s breach17.  
 
Other damages claimed in proceeding where an exempting impediment has been 
found are legal costs for obtaining counsel in a situation where it has been unclear to 
whom the contractual price should be paid18. 
 
3.2 The general requirements of CISG article 79 (1) 
 
To determine if an impediment can be an increase in costs, the general requirements 
for an exemption under CISG article 79 (1) have to first be examined. The general 
conditions for an exemption under CISG article 79 (1) are narrow by design19. An 
exemption from liability is granted rarely20, and the burden of proof on the exempting 
impediment is on the party claiming to be exempted21. This is because contracts are 
generally to be fulfilled and any possible losses or losses of profit are a part of 
business risk. The wording of CISG article 79 (1) defines a four-part requirement for 
an exemption: the failure to perform has to be caused by an impediment, the 
impediment must be beyond the party’s control, the impediment and its 
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consequences must be unforeseeable, and unavoidable. In this chapter, this 
requirement is looked at keeping in mind the grounds for exemption described in the 
previous chapter. 
 
3.2.1 Causal link to an impediment 
 
The first requirement for an exemption under CISG article 79 (1) is that the failure is 
due to an impediment, in other words an overwhelming difficulty22. For a party to be 
exempted the impediment must be the sole reason for the failure to perform23. If the 
exempting impediment consists of several events, all of the events must fulfill all of 
the requirements for an exempting impediment24. 
 
Proving a causal relationship between the impediment and the failure to perform is 
generally relatively easy. When it comes to different aspects of the difficulties and 
determining all of the circumstances that have a causal relationship with the failure to 
perform, caution is to be exercised since even one causing difficulty that is, for 
example, foreseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract means that there 
can be no exemption from damages. 
 
When it comes to the typical grounds for damages in cases involving claims of an 
exempting economic impediment, proving this requirement is not so simple. As most 
of the cases concerning an exempting economic impediment are about either the 
buyer or the seller simply refusing to fulfill the contract due to economic reasons, it 
can be questioned whether there is an alternative motive. However, as the changes 
in economic circumstances are usually relatively easy to prove, there are no 
published cases where the court or the arbitral tribunal has made a point to question 
the motive for the refusal. 
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3.2.2 Unforeseeability 
 
In reality, all possible impediments are foreseeable at some level25. It has to be noted 
that unforeseeability in the sense of CISG article 79 (1) does not mean that an event 
is unthinkable or not considered even remotely possible. A foreseeable event is 
determined from an objective third party’s point of view as to be relatively likely to 
happen26. The required degree of unforeseeability is reached when said third person 
in the actual circumstances of the contract conclusion should not have foreseen the 
event27. 
 
It needs to be stressed that the unforeseeability requirement should be interpreted 
narrowly. Many events, that are unforeseeable in the sense of article 79 (1) CISG, 
such as fires, are foreseeable, for example, in the sense that parties regularly take 
out insurance policies against them. This kind of a vague foreseeability does not 
exclude a party from being exempted. 
 
When it comes to economic impediments, the most common ones claimed are either 
increases or decreases in market prices of goods. It has to be kept in mind that 
changes in market prices are generally foreseeable and a part of the business risk all 
buyers and sellers have to bear. However, this does not mean any and all market 
price fluctuations are foreseeable: there is a limit to which a party should have 
reasonably taken them into account, and this is where CISG article 79 (1) draws the 
line of exemption. 
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3.2.3 Impediment beyond a party’s control 
 
Overwhelming external difficulties are said to fall outside the party’s sphere of risk28. 
This is one of the key requirements for an exemption: clearly, simply refusing to act 
to fulfill a contract cannot be a ground for exemption. However, a party is not required 
to go to any lengths. Finding the limits of the sphere of risk is an integral part of 
assessing grounds for exemption. 
 
The sphere of risk is a concept used to describe the risks a party has to bear. It is 
influenced by contractual risk allocation and practices and usages, but some factors 
that are commonly seen to fall within a party’s sphere of risk can be named. For 
example financial capacity, personal circumstances, and liability for own personnel 
are risks that belong to a party’s sphere of control, and thereby do not usually 
constitute an impediment29. 
 
When it comes to the elements of risk, that are usually seen to fall inside a party’s 
sphere of risk, they can constitute an exempting impediment only in exceptional 
cases. An example of such a risk is procurement risk,30 which is generally born by the 
seller. However, difficulties in procuring parts for a machine can form an exempting 
impediment if a third party, that was supposed to provide the parts, is unable to do so 
because of an exempting impediment31. 
 
Increases and decreases in market prices are generally beyond any one business 
operator’s control. Therefore, when it comes to economic impediments, the 
requirement of being beyond the non-performing party’s control is generally not an 
issue. This means that risk allocation is the main question to be determined when 
analyzing whether an economic impediment is grounds for exemption. 
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3.2.4 Unavoidability 
 
A party is generally obliged to fulfill the contract if it is at all possible. This also 
includes the duty to offer a commercially reasonable substitute if the circumstances 
at hand allow that, and to bear additional costs to overcome difficulties. When it 
comes to economic impediments the requirements of being beyond a party’s control 
and the unavoidability requirement are closely connected: the extent to which a party 
is required to take action to fulfill the contract is also generally determined by 
contractual risk allocation32.  
 
The unavoidability requirement is a key element when addressing the issue of an 
economic impediment. Assessing contractual risk allocation can be difficult, and it 
depends strongly on the quality of contract drafting if it can be done unambiguously. 
When the contract in question provides no clear guidance, the reasonability 
requirement in the CISG article 79 (1) gives the assessors fairly great freedom but 
also mean, that the quality of the assessment heavily depends on the objectivity and 
expertise of the assessors.  
 
3.3 Grounds for exemption in case of an economic impediment 
 
In order for a party to be exempt from liability, the economic impediment must fulfill 
the requirements set out by CISG article 79. The causality requirement and the 
requirement of being beyond the breaching party’s control are generally easy to 
verify: if, for example, an increase in prices or the destruction of goods sold is a result 
of the non-performing party’s actions. However, the requirement of unforeseeability 
should be looked into carefully, as price fluctuations and other economic 
developments are generally foreseeable and belong to the general business risk all 
parties have to accept. Therefore, the change in economic circumstances must be 
very exceptional and surprising to amount to an impediment.  
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Another more challenging requirement is in a sense the essence of whether or not an 
economic change does amount to an exempting impediment. The question of 
whether or not the breaching party could reasonably overcome the impediment or its 
consequences comes down to determining how big of an increase in costs is 
reasonable for the non-performing party to bear in each case individually. Once 
again, some level of an increase in costs in contained within the risk whose 
consequences all parties have to bear. 
 
It can be tempting for a party to claim to be exempted because of an economic 
impediment whenever a contract is no longer desirable due to an increase in costs. 
This exemption, however, should be only granted in extreme cases, as as a rule, 
ending up with an unprofitable transaction is a part of the business risk all operators 
in international trade have to accept. The exemption, if granted, should be granted 
primarily for damages for a delay when performing the contract is mostly difficult 
within the contract’s time frame and much less difficult when given more time. When 
making these decisions, the standard set by the words “could not reasonably be 
expected” should be followed. Assessing the reasonability requirement is looked at in 
more detail in section 5.3. 
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4 INTERPRETING CISG ARTICLE 79 (1) 
 
4.1 Travaux preparatoires 
 
In order to shed light on the drafting process of CISG article 79 (1), and thereby 
provide a more detailed understanding of how the article was meant to be 
interpreted, a look at the travaux preparatoires of the CISG and its predecessor, 
ULIS, is in order. 
 
4.1.1 The revision of the ULIS 
 
The Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) 
of 1964 is the predecessor of the CISG. ULIS article 74 (1) covers the same area 
later covered by article 79 (1) CISG:  
 
“Where one of the parties has not performed one of his obligations, he 
shall not be liable for such non-performance if he can prove that it was 
due to circumstances which, according to the intention of the parties at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract, he was not bound to take into 
account or to avoid or to overcome; in the absence of any expression of 
the intention of the parties, regard shall be had to what reasonable 
persons in the same situation would have intended.” 
 
 
Reasonability assessments were already present in applying ULIS article 74 (1) as, 
when determining what circumstances a party would have to take into account, avoid 
or overcome, “in the absence of any expression of the intention of the parties, regard 
shall be had to what reasonable persons in the same situation would have 
15 
 
 
 
intended.”33 In other words, reasonability assessment was a tool to help deal with 
situations of insufficient contract drafting.  
 
The drafting of the CISG began by a revision of the ULIS, and, as it happens, by a 
proposition to widen the applicability of a reasonability assessment to interpreting 
contracts. In 1973, in the first addendum to the Analysis of Comments and Proposals 
by Governments Relating to Articles 71 to 101 of ULIS, the representative of the 
United Kingdom’s statement reflected their national legal background as they stated: 
“Excuses for non-performance falling short of frustration should be either expressly 
provided for in the contract or ignored.” In their opinion, only circumstances making it 
“impossible” to perform the contract should be regarded as grounds for exemption, 
unless otherwise specifically stated in the contract.34  
 
This view seems to have not stood the test of time. However, it has to be kept in 
mind that the word impossible was not used in the meaning of a physical or legal 
impossibility, but in conjunction with the concept of frustration, which does leave 
some room for extreme difficulties that do not make performance physically or legally 
impossible. The representative also expressed their support for the ULIS article by 
their statement, that unforeseen rises in prices causing a seller to deem performance 
uneconomic should not be a ground for exemption unless the parties or reasonable 
third persons in their places had specifically so intended35.  
 
The representative of the United Kingdom’s suggestion for the wording of CISG 
article 79 (1) was:  
 
“Where one of the parties has not performed one of his obligations, he 
shall neither be required to perform nor be liable for his non-performance 
if he can prove either that performance has become impossible owing to 
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circumstances which, according to the intention of the parties at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract, he was not bound to take into account 
or to avoid or to overcome, or that, owing to such circumstances, 
performance would be so radically changed as to amount to the 
performance of an obligation quite different from that contemplated by 
the contract; if the intention of the parties in these respects at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract was not expressed regard shall be had to 
what the party who has not performed could reasonably have been 
expected to take into account or to avoid or to overcome.”36 
  
 
In practice, the wording does leave room for an economic impediment of the 
magnitude that would radically change the performance of the contract, most likely 
because of the difference between a physical or legal impossibility and impossibility 
in the sense of frustration.  
 
The representative of Norway offered slight changes to the wording of the British 
proposal37. The representative of Ghana expressed their confidence in international 
business operators’ drafting skills as they stated, that grounds for exemption “have 
traditionally been best” left to be determined by the parties in the contract38. As the 
drafting of what would later become CISG article 79 (1) proves, the view of the 
representative of Ghana was disregarded. 
 
In the second addendum to the same document and as comment to the first 
addendum, the representative of Hungary stated, not surprisingly, that in their opinion 
the introduction of the concept of frustration as limit for grounds for exemption would 
not change the scope of ULIS article 74. Furthermore, they called for a more 
autonomous wording of the article as they criticized the suggestion of the 
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representative of the United Kingdom for being complicated, and stated that as ULIS 
tried to use terms common to most legal systems, using the common-law term 
frustration or the term impossibility, which is understood to mean only legal and 
physical impossibility in most civil law systems, would not be advisable. This view 
proved to be accepted wholeheartedly as the drafters later chose to use the word 
impediment instead of frustration or impossibility precisely for the reason named by 
the representative of Hungary. 
 
The representative of Hungary then made a reference to the term “economic 
impossibility” used by German scholars, and stated, that combining it with legal and 
physical impossibility, would lead to much the same outcome as using the term 
impossibility in the sense of frustration. They suggested using the wording “or did not 
fall within his sphere of risk” to rule out price increases as ground for exemption.  
 
With regards to both of these addendums, it is clear that the drafters intended to rule 
out hardship-like increase in prices as grounds for exemption, but allowed for 
grounds also of economic nature, and in every case in a broader sense than a 
classic force majeure. 
 
4.1.2 The CISG in its early stages 
 
At the end of the fifth session of the working group in 1974, the working group 
expressed their inability to agree on a precise wording for the article, and presented 
the following alternatives for it39: A:  
 
“Where a party has not performed one of his obligations in accordance 
with the contract and the present law, he shall not be liable in damages 
for such non-performance if he proves that, owing to circumstances 
which have occurred without fault on his part, performance of that 
                                                 
"%+/&.,
511B"1)4#
18 
 
 
 
obligation has become impossible or has so radically changed as to 
amount to performance of an obligation quite different from that 
contemplated by the contract. For this purpose there shall be deemed to 
be fault unless the non-performing party proves that he could not 
reasonably have been expected to take into account, or to avoid or to 
overcome the circumstances.”  
 
B:  
 
“Where a party has not performed one of his obligations [in accordance 
with the contract and the present Law], he shall not be liable [in 
damages] for such non-performance if he proves that it was due to an 
impediment [which has occurred without any fault on his side and being] 
of a kind which could not reasonably be expected to be taken into 
account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to be avoided or 
overcome thereafter.”40  
 
 
Due to the differences in opinions, the expressions force majeure, impossibility, and 
supervening disability had been used to describe what would later take the form of 
impediment41. It has to be noted that both of these alternatives introduced 
reasonability as a definer of both the unforeseeability and unavoidability 
requirements: this proved to be a lasting solution as it persisted all the way to the 
final article. 
 
In 1975 in the sixth session of the working group, alternatives A and B were 
discussed. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics preferred 
alternative A42, whereas the representative of Austria saw alternatives A and B to be 
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consistent in content43. The representative of Norway submitted, that the exemption 
should also cover the duty to perform, and that for this reason they preferred 
alternative B amended as follows:  
 
“Where a party has not performed one of his obligations in accordance 
with the contract and the present law, he shall neither be required to 
perform nor be liable in damages for such non-performance if he proves 
that it was due to an impediment [which has occurred without fault on his 
side and being] of a kind which a party in his situation could not 
reasonably be expected either to take into account at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract or to avoid or overcome.”44  
 
 
The representative of the United Kingdom presented their study the on the 
convention. They proposed, that as there is a difference between the circumstances 
when the contract can be entirely avoided, and when a party is exempt from 
damages, there should be a clear indication of this in the language of the convention. 
In other words, as there are both circumstances when no performance whatsoever is 
necessary (avoidance) and when performance is necessary, but there is no liability 
for damages for, for example, delivering goods without packages for which the 
contract also calls, this should be clearly visible from the article. For this reason they 
submitted that the test of radical change should be deleted from alternative A. They 
also expressed their view, that the fact that impossibility is interpreted differently in 
different legal systems, and because, therefore, the term itself is vague, the test of 
radical change should be left out to avoid further vagueness. Once again recognizing 
the need to make the language of the article such, that it would encourage 
autonomous interpretation, was, once again, a view that later proved to be generally 
recognized as there are problems with the homeward trend to this day.  
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The representative of the United Kingdom then presented alternative C to address 
the issues they mentioned: 
 
“Where a party has not performed one of his obligations in accordance 
with the contract and the present law, he shall not be liable in damages 
for such non-performance if he proves that it was due to an impediment 
which has [or to circumstances which have] occurred without fault on his 
part. For this purpose there shall be deemed to be fault unless the non-
performing party proves that he could not reasonably have been 
expected to take into account or to avoid or to overcome the impediment 
[the circumstances].”45 
 
The study of the representative of the United Kingdom explains the view of the 
representative of Austria: the test of radical change was not intended to introduce the 
concept of hardship to the CISG in spite of the similarity of its wording to that of a 
common definition of hardship, it was meant to describe the difficulties. The test of 
radical change would most likely deem economic impediments as grounds for 
exemption since it is much more lenient and points less to physical impossibility than 
the previously used force majeure, impossibility, and supervening disability. As 
discarding the test of radical change was justified by avoiding vagueness and 
difficulties in interpretation, it should not be seen as a move to define the grounds for 
exemption more towards physical impossibility. 
 
The Revised text of the Convention on the international sale of goods as approved or 
deferred for further consideration by the Working Group on the International Sale of 
Goods at its first six sessions was published after the sixth session. The wording of 
article 50 (1), which would later become CISG article 79 (1) was finalized as:  
 
“Where a party has not performed one of his obligations, he shall not be 
liable in damages for such non-performance if he proves that it was due 
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to an impediment which has occurred without fault on his part. For this 
purpose there shall be deemed to be fault unless the non-performing 
party proves that he could not reasonably have been expected to take 
into account or to avoid or to overcome the impediment.”46 
 
 
In 1976 the Draft Convention on the International Sale of Goods was published47. 
Article 50 (1), which was later to become CISG article 79 (1), read:  
 
“If a party has not performed one of his obligations, he is not liable in 
damages for such non-performance if he proves that it was due to an 
impediment which occurred without fault on his part. For this purpose 
there is deemed to be fault unless the non-performing party proves that 
he could not reasonably have been expected to take into account or to 
avoid or to overcome the impediment.”48 
 
 
In the commentary it published together with the Draft Convention, the UNCITRAL 
Working Group did not address the question of economic impediments. However, it 
did state that a loss of “500 tools” was to be borne by the seller if the tools were 
destroyed49. This loss is obviously minor and, therefore, this statement brings no 
clarity to the issue at hand. 
 
The representative of Australia called for further provisions when it comes to 
difficulties to perform. They submitted, that the convention is inadequate as it only 
exempts a party from liability in extreme cases, and that there should be a provision 
that would allow for a more flexible adjustment of rights in situations where none of 
the parties are responsible for the change in circumstances, especially in case of 
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delayed delivery as the delivery could be very different from the one called for by the 
contract when time has passed50. This view, again, brings up the question of 
hardship.  
 
The representatives of Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany proposed the 
following wording:  
 
“If a party has not performed one of his obligations, he is not liable in 
damages for such non-performance if he proves that it was due to an 
impediment which he could not reasonably have been expected to take 
into account or to avoid or to overcome.”  
 
 
They also expressed their concern that use of the word fault would lead to confusion 
with the understanding of fault of national legal systems51. This statement showed 
insight, as nationally colored views when interpreting the CISG are a problem to this 
day. 
 
The representative of Czechoslovakia also expressed discontent with the terms used 
to describe fault stating that objective responsibility was more suitable. They also 
called for a more definite expression for the difficulties calling them force majeure, 
and stated that unforeseeability was not a valid requirement as, for example, wars 
are often foreseeable but qualify as force majeure in their opinion. They then 
submitted, that the paragraph should more clearly indicate that the moment of 
conclusion of contract as decisive when determining unforeseeability should the 
requirement persist52. The representative of Denmark stated, that an impediment that 
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existed at the time of the conclusion of a contract should also qualify for an 
exemption from damages53. 
 
The representative of Norway proposed the following wording:  
 
“Where a party has not performed one of his obligations he is not [shall 
neither be required to perform nor be] liable in damages for such non-
performance if he proves that it was due to an impediment beyond his 
control and of a kind which a party in the same situation could not 
reasonably be expected neither to take into account at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract not to avoid or overcome.”  
 
 
They also stated, that it should be made clear that the exemption does not cover 
price reduction and avoidance, and if the article does not clearly state this, it would 
be left up to national laws54. This concern is not very valid since grounds for both 
price reduction and avoidance are expressly settled by the CISG, and, therefore, no 
national law is to be applied55. 
 
The representative of Sweden submitted, that the wording of article 50 was 
unsatisfactory both in content and in wording, and it should be redrafted. They also 
proposed, that performance should be excluded, as a party could otherwise force 
performance. They actually stated, that, for example, when a shortage makes 
delivery particularly difficult, a party should be exempted56. In this statement they 
clearly advocated for exemption due to an economic impediment. However, this 
proposal was significantly more lenient than the later accepted final article. 
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The representative of Poland requested for an amendment in article 50 that would 
give the parties the right to have the contract renegotiated in a case of hardship. 
They also called for a provision that would concern penalties to promote uniformity57. 
The fact that these proposals were denied further speaks for the view that a gap was 
left in the CISG when it comes to contractual penalties, and that hardship was 
intentionally left out. This is because the handling of contractual penalties is a 
question of validity, which is intentionally deemed to be outside of the scope of the 
CISG,58 and thereby to be governed by an applicable national law. The concept of 
hardship, however, is a matter of substantive law, and it is left out entirely. 
 
The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proposed that the 
wording of article 50 (1) would be clarified to begin with: “If a party has not performed 
one of his obligations, he is not liable for such non-performance if he proves…”59 This 
wording does not specify if the liability for non-performance only means damages or 
not, so it is questionable if this, in fact, would be a clarifying amendment. 
 
The representative of the United States of America proposed article 50 (1) to be 
worded as follows:  
 
“If a party has not performed one of his obligations, he is not liable in 
damages for such non-performance if he proves that it was due to an 
impediment which has occurred without fault on his part and whose non-
occurrence was an implied condition of the contract. For this purpose 
there is deemed to be fault unless the non-performing party proves that 
he could not reasonably have been expected to [take] have taken the 
impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or 
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to [avoid] have avoided or [to] overcome [the impediment] it after it 
occurred.”60  
 
 
This wording would suggest a stricter interpretation of impediment. As implied 
conditions are difficult to show, accepting this proposal would have, most likely, 
resulted in even greater difficulties in applying this article than the current ones, so 
the fact that it was rejected is fortunate. 
 
The representative of the International Chamber of Commerce submitted, that the 
conditions for exemption are in line with the traditional interpretation of force majeure, 
and considered this a welcome change from ULIS article 74, as they saw its 
requirements as referring to “some very hypothetical situations”. They stated that the 
narrow requirements are a positive thing, as the article is not meant to introduce 
vagueness to contractual clauses, but to provide minimum security in cases when the 
contract has been inadequately drafted and, therefore, a force majeure clause is left 
out. They saw no problem in use of the word fault as the concept was defined 
specifically, and were pleased that the provision did not address the duty to perform 
as the choice to avoid the contract should be left to the performing party61. These 
comments show a very practical view on the CISG, as time has shown that parties 
often draft a choice of law clause that points to different rules of law than the CISG.  
 
The representative of the International Chamber of Commerce shows disillusionment 
when it comes to the international meaning of the convention: they see it as a safety 
net in case of insufficient contract drafting and evaluates it as such instead of looking 
for the perfect law to be applied to the bulk of international sales contracts. Sadly for 
the advocates of the CISG, time has shown them to have been right. 
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The Committee of the Whole I established by the UNCITRAL reviewed the 
propositions of the working group. It chose to delete the words “in damages” as it 
noted that if performance could be forced, exemption from liability would be without 
meaning. It also removed the word fault, and used the expression to be beyond a 
party’s control instead while stating, that circumstances that are due to a party’s 
actions do not constitute an impediment, and chose to include the specification that 
the unforeseeability is evaluated at the time of the conclusion of a contract. It also 
specifically rejected the proposed article on hardship, and, thereby, ultimately 
formulated the article 79 (1) as it stands in the CISG62.  
 
4.2. Effects of the homeward trend on the interpretation of CISG article 79 (1) 
 
Three instances, which have proven especially problematic when it comes to 
avoiding the homeward trend, are force majeure, the validity of and distinction 
between liquidated damages and contractual penalties, and hardship. There have 
been attempts to introduce the concepts of force majeure and hardship from national 
legal cultures into the CISG, and the question of whether the exemption from 
damages provided by CISG article 79 also applies to liquidated damages and 
contractual penalties has been asked.  
 
4.2.1 Force majeure 
 
The concepts of impediment and force majeure are used as synonyms at times63. 
This is to be avoided strictly. The concept of force majeure and an exempting 
impediment under the CISG must be kept separate from another because an 
exempting impediment under the CISG differs from both the traditional concept of 
force majeure and the force majeure provisions of national legal systems. A 
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traditional force majeure refers to a practical impossibility, while an impediment 
constitutes a more flexible concept64.  It has to be noted that the concept of an 
impediment in the sense of CISG article 79 (1) also differs from the force majeure 
provisions of any national legal systems65. On a continuum from a hardship, the 
equilibrium of a contract being changed without any actual difficulties to perform 
necessary66, to the practical impossibility of a traditional force majeure, an 
impediment lays somewhere in the middle.  
 
The drafters of the CISG clearly expressed, that the term force majeure is not to be 
used when referring to the exemption under CISG article 79. This can be expressly 
read from the drafting history of the CISG67. Imprecise use of terminology and 
supplementing concepts of the CISG with terms from national legal cultures is very 
likely to worsen the problem of the homeward trend. It is also likely to lead to 
incorrect interpretation of the CISG and, therefore, a situation where parties cannot 
rely on the provisions of the law they have chosen to govern the contract between 
them to be used to govern their contractual relationship in the way the parties have 
intended. The drafters of both CISG article 79 and its predecessor, ULIS article 74, 
have refrained from using the term force majeure, the appliers of the provisions 
should do the same. 
 
4.2.2 Liquidated damages and contractual penalties 
 
It is not expressly stated in the CISG whether or not exemptions under CISG article 
79 also apply to liquidated damages and contractual penalties. The wording of CISG 
article 79 (5) points to “damages under this Convention,” which can be interpreted 
either way. This constitutes a gap in the CISG68. 
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There are two main views concerning exemptions from liquidated damages and 
contractual penalties under the CISG. On one hand, there is a view that a party 
cannot be exempted from liquidated damages and contractual penalties under CISG 
article 79. This would mean that the gap is external, and applicable national law 
should be found by using the rules of private international law and then the national 
law should be used to determine the validity of the contractual clause containing 
liquidated damages or contractual penalties69.   
 
On the other hand, there is also a view that liquidated damages that come instead of 
conventional damages under the CISG are subject to the exemption whereas 
contractual penalties are not70. Contractual penalties are generally considered 
unenforceable in the Anglo-American legal tradition71. A strong need, which stems 
from said legal tradition, to differentiate between contractual penalties and liquidated 
damages is clearly visible in the second view. When this view is analyzed, the 
requirement of CISG article 7 (1) to take note of the international character of the 
CISG and the need to promote uniformity has to be kept in mind, and, therefore, 
nationally colored views are to be disregarded72. 
 
Accepting the first view would limit parties’ contractual freedom in favor of the 
applicable national law as parties would be kept from pre-agreeing on a sum of 
damages or a formula to calculate damages when the applicable national law would 
deem contractual penalties unenforceable. Contractually pre-agreeing on calculation 
of damages provides the parties with the opportunity to allocate risk in any manner of 
their choosing and to gain more predictability, not to mention speeding up the legal 
process and sparing legal costs in case a dispute arises. However, this problem can 
be solved by choosing a law, under which contractual penalties are enforceable, to 
be applied to the penalties or liquidated damages clause. 
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During the drafting process of the CISG, representatives from Norway and the 
Federal Republic of Germany made suggestions to extinguish the duty to perform in 
cases of an impediment73. This would mean that liquidated damages or penalties 
could not be claimed. The fact that both of these suggestions were rejected suggests 
that the principle impossibilium nulla est obligatio does not apply, and thereby 
liquidated damages and contractual penalties can be claimed regardless of the 
exemption provided by CISG article 79 (1)74. 
 
The UNCITRAL Secretariat Commentary on the 1978 draft of what would later 
become the CISG, the closest thing to an official commentary of the CISG, reads:  
 
”It is a matter of domestic law not governed by this Convention as to 
whether the failure to perform exempts the non-performing party from 
paying a sum stipulated in the contract for liquidated damages or as a 
penalty for non-performance or as to whether a court will order a party to 
perform in these circumstances and subject him to the sanctions 
provided in its procedural law for continued non-performance.”75  
 
 
This suggest that the drafters of the CISG expressly meant for the question of both 
penalties and liquidated damages to be solved applying the applicable domestic law. 
Therefore, the gap in the CISG when it comes to determining the possible exemption 
from penalties and liquidated damages is an external gap. The gap is to be filled by 
turning to the law deemed applicable using rules of private international law as CISG 
article 7 (2) determines76.  
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4.2.3 Hardship 
 
Hardship is a commonly known contractual concept that is defined as a situation 
where performing a contract becomes drastically more burdensome than originally 
expected for one party while bringing significant unjust enrichment to the other 
party77. The CISG contains no specific provisions concerning hardship.  
 
There have been some attempts to introduce the concept of hardship into the CISG. 
This has been attempted by either claiming that there is a gap in the CISG 
considering hardships that has to be filled78 or by applying the requirements of a 
hardship to an economic impediment79. Sometimes the terms hardship and economic 
impediment have even been seen as synonyms80. 
 
If one would follow the view that there is a gap in the CISG when it comes to 
hardship, the question would once again be whether the gap is external, and should 
be filled with an applicable national law, or internal, and should be filled by turning to 
the underlying principles of the CISG81. CISG article 7 (2) deems underlying 
principles as the primary source for filling gaps. Possible ways of finding said 
underlying principles is looking to the principle of good faith in CISG article 7 (1), or 
searching CISG article 79 (5) for ways for a court or a tribunal to determine what the 
parties owe each other and thereby adapt the contract in question82. It has to be 
noted that this approach is very broad and does not serve the need to promote 
uniformity and predictability. Seeking all possible means and justifications to 
introduce new elements into the CISG is a slippery slope. When it comes to seeing 
gaps when there are elements that have been deliberately left out of the CISG, it will 
eventually lead to an even greater lack of consensus as there is most likely a train of 
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thought for each national concept to be somehow in line with underlying principles of 
the CISG, such as good faith. This is true also when it comes to an external gap 
considering hardship: it cannot be seen that any concept that is not mentioned in the 
CISG shows a gap that is to be filled with applicable national law. 
 
The drafters of the CISG specifically named the intent not to introduce the theorie de 
l'imprevision, the French equivalent to hardship, as a reason not to accept a 
Norwegian proposal to modify the wording of what would become CISG article 79 
(3)83. They also specifically dismissed a proposed provision on hardship84. This 
provides further proof that there is no gap: the drafters meant that parties should not 
be able to make claims of hardship to avoid damages or to have the contract 
modified by a court or an arbitration tribunal. 
 
Parties, who wish to include elements of hardship into their contractual relationship 
are able to do so by implementing a choice of law clause calling for the CISG to be 
supplemented with, for example, the UNIDROIT Principles. The CEAC model choice 
of law clause (option b) is an example of such a clause:  
 
“The contract shall be governed by the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods of 1980 (CISG) without 
regard to any national reservation, supplemented for matters which are 
not governed by the CISG, by the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts and these supplemented by the otherwise 
applicable national law.”  
 
 
                                                 
83
 &@3+"@@		4" 
84
 %+/&.,
511B"1)4 
32 
 
 
 
The concept of hardship was intentionally left out of the CISG. Therefore, parties 
should not be able to successfully make claims relying on hardship when the CISG is 
applied unsupplemented85. 
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5 ECONOMIC IMPEDIMENT AND REASONABILITY 
 
5.1 Economic impossibility  
 
Peter Schlechtriem accepted economic difficulties or “unaffordability” as a ground for 
exemption in his book Einheitliches UN-Kaufrecht, which was based on the notes he 
took during the CISG drafting conference and published in 1981. He described an 
economic impediment but did not use the term itself86. 
 
German scholars have used the term “economic impossibility” (wirtschaftliche 
Unmöglichkeit) from early on when interpreting the wording “reasonably be expected 
to - - - have avoided or overcome it or its consequences” of CISG article 79 (1)87. It 
has to be noted that the whole concept of wirtschaftliche Unmöglichkeit is an 
important German doctrine that was adopted by German legal scholars and 
legislation specifically to fight the effects of the massive inflation in Germany after the 
First World War88, and the effect of the concept’s meaning and importance in 
German law is clearly visible in the German interpretation of CISG article 79 (1). 
Once again, views stemming from national legal systems are to be discarded89. 
 
5.2 From the limit of sacrifice to what is reasonable 
 
In modern scholarly works there is a growing consensus that at least a rapid, 
unforeseeable, and extreme increase in costs constitutes an impediment, but 
drawing the line is difficult and should be done in each case individually taking all 
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circumstances into account90. The limit of sacrifice standard is accepted, for example, 
by the CISG Advisory Council as it describes the circumstances that can lead to 
exemption on the basis of economic impediment as:  
 
““economic impossibility” which, while short of an absolute bar to perform, 
imposes what in some legal systems is conceptualized as a “limit of sacrifice” 
beyond which the obligor cannot be reasonably expected to perform”. 
 
 
To help determining how big of an increase in costs parties have to bear, the concept 
of a limit of sacrifice has been introduced. To amount to an economic impediment 
under the CISG, the increase in costs has to cross a limit of sacrifice above which the 
party cannot reasonably be expected to fulfill the contract91. This limit must be 
defined for each case individually, and it should be applied sparingly and to extreme 
cases only. As a rule, a 100 per cent increase in cost does not yet constitute an 
economic impediment, and in case of speculative transactions, even a 300 per cent 
increase may not92. When the ultimate limit of sacrifice will not be crossed, a party 
has the duty to do everything in its power to perform the contract93. 
 
The limit of sacrifice is not to be looked at as a matter of numbers. A loss of a specific 
amount of money can be irrelevant to a bigger operator in the field of international 
trade, and potentially fatal to a smaller one. Therefore, it cannot be simply stated, 
that when the increase in costs is less than a specific percentage, there can be no 
economic impediment. In specific instances, when a small company relies on few 
transactions that are big to it to keep operating, a relatively small increase in costs in 
one of these transactions can be very detrimental to it, and even make it insolvent. 
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Again, it has to be noted that the wording of CISG article 79 (1) sets the limit to which 
a party has to go to fulfill a contract to “reasonably be expected - - - to have avoided 
or overcome it or its consequences.” Therefore, reasonability clearly is a key concept 
in analyzing each individual case.  
 
Historically, the reasonability requirement has been closely tied with the concept of 
an economic impediment from early on. Frenchman Denis Tallon described what 
essentially is an economic impediment in the Bianca/Bonell commentary in 1987:  
 
“If an object is lost at sea and can be fished out in good condition 
although at great cost, the final solution will not be the same if the said 
object is a highly valuable sculpture or merely a machine tool.”94  
 
 
Thereby, he implied that as the increase in costs in fishing up a machine tool would 
be so great in relation to the value of the tool, the increase in costs would exempt a 
party from liability (most likely of a late delivery as a substitute machine tool could 
probably be easily obtained). This introduces the element of commercial 
reasonability, and thereby exemption grounds due to an increase in costs i.e. 
economic impediment, to examples 65 A-C of the Secretariat Commentary95. 
 
The Secretariat Commentary itself contains the concept of commercial reasonability: 
it is stated, that in the case of an unanticipated imposition of exchange controls or a 
similar impediment, the buyer is only exempted from liability for damages if there is 
no commercially reasonable substitute form of payment or other similar way to 
overcome the impediment96. 
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Respectively, in example 65 D it is stated, that when a contract calls for plastic 
packaging but it is not available due to an exempting impediment, the seller is 
required to use a commercially reasonable substitute packaging if it is available 
rather than refuse to deliver to avoid being liable for damages even when this would 
mean that the buyer would be entitled to a price reduction97. When it comes to this 
example, both the price and usefulness of the substitute packaging should be 
considered when it is determined what is commercially reasonable. If the buyer will 
have to repackage the goods the limit should be set low, but if the buyer can make 
use of the goods as they are in the substitute packaging, it is commercially 
reasonable for the seller to bear more costs for the substitute packaging. The loss of 
profit this will cause the seller is a part of the business risk the seller has to bear. 
 
5.3 Assessing reasonability 
 
When assessing reasonability it has to be kept in mind that generally it is very 
reasonable for two equally powerful professional business operators to fulfill the 
contract to which they have committed even if there are difficulties and additional 
costs. It can be very tempting for a party to try to avoid unfavorable transactions 
caused by what are essentially reckless business decisions by keeping from fulfilling 
a contract and then claiming exempting circumstances. This cannot be allowed. 
Exempting impediments are very exceptional situations and the grounds for 
exemption are to be interpreted narrowly. 
 
Generally, reasonability is evaluated by utilizing the reasonable person test. This 
means, that a fictional reasonable person with the attention, knowledge, intelligence, 
and judgment of an average operator is pictured. The instance evaluating 
reasonability then deducts how the reasonable person would act in the situation and 
with the knowledge of the party evaluated in the situation in question98.  
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Reasonability, like other concepts of the CISG, has to be interpreted as CISG article 
7 (1) provides. This means the CISG should be interpreted autonomously, and the 
concept of reasonability should not be seen from the viewpoint of any national legal 
system99. As exemption from damages is governed by the CISG but the definition of 
reasonability is not expressly settled by the CISG, the definition of reasonability can 
be seen as an internal gap in the CISG. Therefore, the underlying principles of the 
CISG are to be taken into account when assessing reasonability100. 
 
A generally well-accepted, but not necessarily exhaustive list of the underlying 
principles was compiled by Ulrich Magnus, a German scholar, in 1995. In his list he 
included the following principles: party autonomy, good faith, estoppel (disputed), 
place of performance of monetary obligations, burden of proof (of the claimant or 
beneficiary), full compensation, dispatch principle (the mailbox rule), informality (no 
writing requirement), mitigation, trade usages or customs, set-off (disputed), interest, 
pro-contractuality, and fair trading101. Which of and to what extend these principles 
prove useful when assessing reasonability, depends on the situation at hand. 
 
When it comes to the situations described in section 3.1 of this thesis, in the 
instances of the seller’s non-performance due to an increase in the market price of 
the sold goods after the conclusion of a contract and when the buyer has simply 
refused to accept goods due to a drop in market price, the principle of pro-
contractuality would speak against accepting the exemption. When it comes to the 
buyer’s non-performance in the instance it has refused to accept goods due to the its 
customer’s decision to reduce the price it would pay for the goods, the same could be 
said especially since it could be seen as unreasonable to allow a party exemption 
from a contractual relationship to which it has committed simply because its chosen 
third party contractual partner has refused to honor its contractual obligation.  
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However, in all three cases it could be argued that the principles of good faith and 
even fair trading, depending on the parties, would direct the interpreter towards 
accepting the exemption. It is noticeable that the underlying principles of the CISG 
share a common weakness with other elements of the CISG: ambiguity. Moreover, it 
is hard to imagine that the bulk of the underlying principles, such as the dispatch 
principle and informality, would prove to be useful in a great number of situations. 
 
One of the underlying principles of the CISG is the principle of party autonomy102. 
This principle overrides all reasonability assessments if parties choose to utilize the 
opportunity provided by CISG to “derogate from or vary the effect of any of its 
provisions”103. Contract provisions clearly containing an exhaustive list of exempting 
circumstances supersede CISG article 79 (1)104. However, if it is not clearly indicated 
that a contract provision contains an exhaustive list of grounds for exemption, it can 
be seen as a way to expand CISG article 79 (1). As parties can simply exclude CISG 
article 79 (1) from the contractual relationship between them altogether by a simple 
sentence in a contract, absent from a clearly worded exclusion, force majeure 
clauses or other clauses about possible difficulties with fulfilling the contract should 
not be seen as superseding to CISG article 79 (1)105. 
 
CISG article 9 (2) states:  
 
“The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly 
made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the 
parties knew or ought to have known and which in international trade is 
widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the 
type involved in the particular trade concerned.” 
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This has to also be taken into account when assessing reasonability in each 
individual case: established usages, of which the parties have or should have been 
aware, are considered to be a part of the contract. Therefore, even if the presence of 
the established usages leads to circumstances, which would otherwise be 
considered grounds for exemption from damages due to unreasonability, the 
exemption cannot be granted.  This is because an established usage is seen as an 
implied expression of party autonomy, which is equated with a contract provision 
calling for the derogation from or varying the effects of the reasonability requirement 
of the CISG. The trade mentioned in the article may be restricted to the trade of a 
certain product, trade in a certain region or a particular set of trading partners106.  
 
CISG article 77 deems the non-breaching party also responsible to contribute to the 
fulfilment of the contract at the risk of losing its right to damages as there is a duty to 
mitigate damages. Therefore, if the seller is faced with an economic impediment, any 
inactivity from the buyer has to be taken into account when determining the 
reasonable additional costs the seller will have to bear to fulfill the contract. If the 
buyer does not fulfill its duty to mitigate damages, there is no need to go through the 
entire process of evaluating all of the grounds for exemption when it comes to the 
losses the buyer could have mitigated as the buyer’s right to these damages is 
directly limited by CISG article 77. However, the costs of these mitigations may be 
claimed as damages,107 and as these damages are damages under the CISG in the 
sense of CISG article 79 (5), the seller can be exempted from liability from them if 
there is an exempting impediment. 
 
It has to be noted that in extreme cases the reasonability requirement provides a 
level minimum protection to a weaker party. This can be the case, for example, when 
a small company sells one highly specialized item a year, and this item it is providing 
a large company is unexpectedly destroyed. It cannot be reasonably expected, that 
the small company purchases a replacement for 100 per cent of its yearly production 
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at a price greatly above the amount it will get from selling said replacement, as this 
would most likely make the small company insolvent, especially if a delay in 
procuring the item is close to irrelevant to the large company. In this instance the 
small company should be exempted from damages for a delay, if not for not 
delivering the item at all. On the other hand, if the large company is selling a part to 
the small company’s item, and the part is destroyed, the large company can be 
reasonably expected to purchase a replacement when this monetary loss is close to 
irrelevant to it, but the delay or non-delivery is detrimental to the small company. 
Such imbalances between the parties should ideally be dealt with by means of 
contract drafting, but as mentioned, the reasonability requirement itself acts as a 
minimum level safety net in extreme cases108.  
 
5.4 Jurisprudence 
 
There have been several instances of parties claiming to be exempted due to an 
economic impediment. In most cases they have been unsuccessful109. 
 
In ICC case 6281/1989 the seller had agreed to sell 80.000 metric tons of steel bars 
for a set price, but later refused due to an increase in the price of steel. At the time of 
the conclusion of the contract, the price of steel had already begun to increase 
slightly. The court did deem the CISG to not be applicable, as it had not yet been 
entered into force. However, the court did consider the CISG’s grounds for exemption 
and found that a price increase of about 13 per cent did not suffice, especially 
considering the foreseeability of price fluctuations especially in this case110. The 
District Court of Monza, Italy, found similarly in a case where it did not find the CISG 
applicable but nevertheless considered, that a price increase of 30 per cent did not 
suffice as grounds for exemption111. 
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The Belgian Commercial Court of Tongeren found that as the price of steel had 
unexpectedly risen by about 70 per cent after the conclusion of the contract but 
before delivery, the seller was exempted, but called the increase in price an 
economic hardship. This decision was later overturned by the Court of Appeal in 
Antwerp, which found that there is a gap in the CISG when it comes to economic 
hardship, and applied a national law. The Belgian Supreme Court found that the 
there was a gap in the CISG to be filled by general principles of international trade, 
and that there were no grounds for exemption, and that the duty to renegotiate the 
contract was a legal consequence of an economic hardship112. 
 
The Appellate Court of Hamburg, Germany, ruled that when it came to a case of an 
approximately 34 per cent increase in tomato prices due to heavy rains, there were 
no grounds for exemption as the seller could have fulfilled the contract113. The same 
court has also stated that the seller bears the risk for an increased market price when 
a substitute transaction is to be made. It found that a 300 per cent increase in price 
did not cross the limit of sacrifice as the transaction in the case at hand was highly 
speculative, and thereby, this increase in price was insufficient to amount to an 
exempting economic impediment114.  
 
On the other hand, the Arbitration Court of the Chamber of Commerce of Hamburg 
specifically listed “force majeure, economic impossibility or excessive onerousness” 
as grounds for exemption. In the case it was considering, the buyer and the seller 
had concluded a basic agreement for their co-operation, and a commercial contract 
for specific goods. The buyer had withheld payments under previous contracts and 
as a Chinese sub-supplier of the seller had lost its state credit, a lack of funds had 
kept the sub-supplier from performing. The Arbitration Court found that the grounds 
for exemption were not present neither when it came to the basic contract, as a 
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payment of the due debts would have solved the sub-suppliers lack of funds, nor 
when it came to the contract for specific goods, as there was a pre-payment clause in 
contract for specific goods that deemed the seller to be the bearer of the contractual 
risk as the buyer had made the pre-payment115. 
 
The Supreme Court of Poland reversed a ruling of a Court of Appeals and remanded 
the case as the Court of Appeals had failed to consider if a price increase could be 
an exempting impediment in 2012. A German buyer had concluded a contract for 
several shipments of coke fuel with a Polish seller, but as the price of coke fuel had 
doubled after the conclusion of the contract, the seller had refused to continue 
shipments at the agreed price. The buyer then had avoided the contract and sued for 
damages116. 
 
This case is very interesting as the Supreme Court hints that such a low increase in 
price could be an exempting impediment under CISG article 79 (1).  The case has 
been reversed and remanded by the Supreme Court of Poland already once before 
this last ruling in 2008.117 Therefore, it might take some time before there is a final 
ruling. 
 
When the increase in costs for fulfilling the contract is due to a single contractual 
partner of the breaching party, a simple refusal or changing of mind does not 
constitute an exempting impediment. French Supreme Court found, that when a 
buyer’s customer reduced the price it would pay for the goods, not only was the 
reduction of the repurchase price by the predictable at the time of conclusion of the 
contract, but it was up to the buyer, who was aware of entering into a long-term 
business relationship, to provide for mechanisms of renegotiation for the case of 
changes of circumstances118. 
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The Swiss Court of First Instance of Willisau found that a buyer was exempt from 
damages for a delayed payment of the sales price because two parties claimed to be 
the rightful assignees of said price, which resulted in a court order freezing the 
original payment. The court specifically names the risk of double payment as an 
exempting impediment:  
 
“Thus, there were undoubtedly objective circumstances that hindered the 
payment. Due to these circumstances, [Buyer] could not be sure, to 
whom it could pay without the risk of double payment.”119 
 
 
Thereby, it is implied that a 100 per cent increase in the costs of a timely fulfillment of 
a contract is already enough to count as an exempting impediment, even when, as it 
would have been in this case, most if not all of the extra money spent including legal 
and other expenses could most likely be retrieved at a later point in time. 
 
Another interesting case is the finding of the District Court of Maastricht that in a case 
of a potato producer being unable to supply enough potatoes due to a bad harvest 
caused by extreme weather conditions, it did not matter that the seller could have 
procured substitute potatoes as the contract between the buyer and the seller 
specified that the obligation to deliver was limited to the potatoes grown by the 
seller120.  
 
The exact limit of additional costs a party has to bear varies from case to case as 
tribunals and courts interpret CISG article 79 (1). However, this is both predictable 
and a positive finding as every case and situation is to be evaluated individually when 
it comes to whether or not an exempting impediment is present.  
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6 A COMPARISON OF EXEMPTING ECONOMIC IMPEDIMENTS IN THE CISG 
AND IN THE FINNISH SALE OF GOODS ACT 
 
6.1 General grounds for exemption  
 
When the Finnish Sale of Goods Act came into force, it introduced a shift in the way 
exemptions from damages were seen in the Finnish legal system. Previously, 
damages due to a breach of contract had been seen as damages for negligence: the 
party, which suffered the losses, bore the burden of proof for the alleged breach and 
the causality between the breach and the losses suffered, and when it succeeded in 
proving these two things, negligence from the breaching party was assumed and 
damages awarded unless the breaching party could prove it had not been negligent 
and, thereby, be exempted from damages121. The grounds for an exemption from 
damages provided by Finnish Sale of Goods Act, on the other hand, are stricter as 
the concept of an exempting impediment was introduced. This meant that the party, 
which had allegedly breached a contract, had to prove that there were overwhelming 
difficulties keeping it from fulfilling the contract in order to be exempted from 
damages122. 
 
When it comes to the actual provision in which the grounds for an exemption from 
damages are described, section 27 (1) of the Finnish Sale of Goods Act is worded 
very similarly to CISG article 79 (1): 
 
“The buyer is entitled to damages for losses that he suffers because of 
the seller's delay in delivery, unless the seller proves that the delay was 
due to an impediment beyond his control which he could not reasonably 
be expected to have taken into account at the time of the conclusion of 
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the contract and whose consequences he could not reasonably have 
avoided or overcome.” 
 
 
The grounds for exemption in this section are valid when it comes to both claims for 
damages due to a delay in delivery and a defect in the goods123. The four-part 
requirement of CISG article 79 (1) is repeated in this section: the requirements of a 
causal link to an impediment, unforeseeability, the impediment being beyond the 
breaching party’s control, and unavoidability are all spelled out.  
 
Similar grounds for exemption from damages apply when the buyer does not fulfill 
the contract124. However, for a delay in payment there are specific requirements:   
 
“The seller is entitled to damages for losses that he suffers because of 
the buyer's delay in payment unless the buyer proves that the delay was 
due to a provision of law, general interruption of communications or 
payment services or to other similar impediment which the buyer could 
not reasonably be expected to have taken into account at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract and whose consequences he could not 
reasonably have avoided or overcome.”125 
 
 
Although there are specific circumstances named, the four-part requirement of CISG 
article 79 (1) is present in this section also. However, as discussed in chapter 2 of 
this thesis, a mere similarity in wording does not mean that the interpretation of these 
provisions should be identical. For example, it has to be noted that the Finnish Sale 
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of Goods Act, unlike the CISG126, also applies to sales of goods bought for personal, 
family or household use127. 
 
Sections 27 (4) and 40 (3) of the Finnish Sale of Goods Act name exceptions to 
exempting impediments: if the losses suffered by the buyer are the results of the 
seller being negligent or the goods not conforming to an express warranty of the 
seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract, the seller cannot be exempted 
from damages. The former part of this exception overlaps the four-part requirement 
for an exemption from damages, as a party obviously can avoid being negligent. The 
latter part can be seen to broaden the seller’s liability for a defect in the goods as it 
applies even if the seller was not and should not have been aware of the defect128. 
 
6.2 Indirect losses 
 
A clear and significant difference between CISG article 79 (1) and sections 27 (1) 
and 57 (1) of the Finnish Sale of Goods Act is that indirect losses are generally not 
recoverable under the Finnish provisions129 unless the non-performing party has 
been negligent130. However, it has to be noted that there are exceptions to this rule: 
according to section 40 (3) of the Finnish Sale of Goods Act, both direct and indirect 
losses are recoverable if the losses are due to the goods not conforming to an 
express warranty of the seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract. Therefore, 
if the seller has committed to delivering the contractual goods with a specified 
property, it is irrelevant whether the damages claimed by the buyer are resulting from 
direct or indirect losses131. Similarly, if the buyer has agreed to purchase goods, 
which have to be especially produced or acquired for it and the buyer cancels the 
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contract after the seller has already taken action to fulfill the contract, it is irrelevant 
whether the seller has suffered direct or indirect losses when damages for losses 
caused by the cancellation are awarded132.   
 
The general rule of indirect losses not being recoverable means that, unless the 
exceptions described above apply, the breaching party does not need to be 
exempted from claims for damages when it comes to the following losses: 
 
“Indirect loss consists of the following: 
(1) loss due to reduction or interruption in production or turnover; 
(2) other loss arising because the goods cannot be used as intended; 
(3) loss of profit arising because a contract with a third party has been 
lost or breached; 
(4) loss due to damage to property other than the goods sold; and 
(5) other similar loss that is difficult to foresee.”133 
 
 
This is very relevant as a significant portion of the grounds for damages mentioned in 
section 3.1 of this thesis are indirect losses under Finnish trade law.  
 
The Finnish Sale of Goods Act does not define direct losses, but it is apparent that 
losses that are not indirect are seen as direct. The travaux preparatoires of the 
section state the following: 
 
“According to subsection 1 of the paragraph, loss due to reduction or 
interruption in production or turnover is considered indirect loss. 
Therefore, the loss of business income, which is caused to the buyer 
from losing the chance to conclude contracts with its clients or to fulfill 
more long term running supply contracts due to the seller’s breach of 
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contract is indirect loss. Also the reduction of turnover because of, for 
example, a capacity or storage deficiency due to reduction or interruption 
of production, and as a result, the marketing of products becomes more 
difficult or weakens the competitiveness of the company as it has to 
reserve longer times for delivery, is indirect loss. 
 
Also a reduction of business income because of a reduction of the 
goods’ market value during the seller’s delay, and consequently the 
buyer receiving a lower price when making a resale than it would have 
gotten had the seller delivered the goods in a timely fashion, is indirect 
loss. The reduction of the buyer’s business income due to a piece of 
machinery meant for the buyer’s production process and delivered by the 
seller not functioning properly, and therefore, the goods, which have 
been produced or worked on with the piece of machinery, being of less 
quality than usually and because of that, they can only be sold with a 
price lower than normally, is also indirect loss. 
 
According to subsection 2 of the paragraph, loss other than the loss 
described in subsection 1 resulting from fact that the goods cannot be 
used in the way it was intended to be used is indirect loss. A delay in 
delivery of a copier or a computer, which the buyer had ordered, slowing 
down or complicating the routine processes of the company without 
resulting in direct economic loss, for example in the form of a reduction in 
turnover, can be named as an example. A comparable situation is in 
question when, for example, a piece of farming machinery acquired by a 
farmer or a car bought by a company is out of order for a period of time 
because of a defect and it does not result in or cannot be proven to result 
in direct economic loss. 
 
Therefore, in case general principles of mitigation of damages call for 
restitution of this type of loss of use of the goods, for example in the form 
49 
 
 
 
of a so-called downtime payment, according to the bill it constitutes an 
indirect loss. As previously stated, a buyer who has to rely on outside 
services or rent a substitute good in order to maintain its operations, can, 
under specific circumstances, be entitled to restitution of these costs as 
direct loss. 
 
According to subsection 3 of the paragraph, not receiving profit due to a 
contract with a third party being improperly fulfilled or cancelled is 
indirect loss. The provision applies to situations, where the buyer has 
concluded a contract for further selling the goods ordered or acquired 
from the seller, either as such or further processed, and a breach by the 
seller leads to the contract for further sale being cancelled. Due to this, 
the buyer loses the profit it would have otherwise acquired from this 
contract. 
 
A profit that the buyer loses because a potential contract with a third 
party, which would require the seller’s delivery in order to be fulfilled, is 
not concluded due to the seller’s breach is considered indirect loss. The 
buyer having had ordered a specialty device in order to fulfill a particular 
contract, which is in the negotiation phase, and this contract being 
cancelled because of the seller’s delay in delivery, can be mentioned as 
an example. 
 
According to subsection 4 of the paragraph, damage to property other 
than the goods sold is considered indirect loss.”134 
 
 
As a crude rule of thumb, losses, which can be easily proven in both causality to the 
breach and monetary amount, such as obtaining substitute goods or services to 
cover for the ones called for by the contract and then producing a receipt as proof of 
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the price paid for the substitute, are considered direct losses under Finnish sales law, 
whereas losses, which are visible in calculations and prognoses, such as a reduction 
in turnover, which is visible from a profit and loss statement, are considered indirect 
losses. The direct economic loss, such as a reduction in turnover, due to a piece of 
machinery intended for the use of the buyer is named as an exception to this rule.  
It has to also be noted, that according to section 67 (3) of the Finnish Sale of Goods 
Act, losses caused to the non-breaching party due to its mitigation of direct losses 
are not considered indirect losses. 
 
It is somewhat illogical that when the buyer is able to fully fulfill a contract with a third 
party, any excess costs this has caused the buyer are considered direct losses and 
recoverable, but if the buyer produces goods that are of a lesser quality, an 
insufficient quantity of goods, goods, whose value has reduced due to delay or 
cannot fulfill the contract with a third party at all, losses due to these circumstances 
are considered indirect losses and not recoverable under the Finnish Sale of Goods 
Act. 
 
Expenses from clarifying the situation or locating a defect in the goods, expenses 
from (vainly) installing a defective good, and transporting costs due to a breach of 
contract are considered direct losses135. When a buyer sells a non-conforming good 
to a third party, the legal costs from court proceedings against the third party are also 
direct losses136. 
 
Losses due to payments made because of a liquidated damages or a penalty clause 
in a contract with a third party are seen as indirect losses, and should be dealt with 
by means of a liquidated damages or a penalty clause in the contract between the 
buyer and the seller. It should also be noted that liquidated damages and penalty 
clauses are valid under Finnish law137. In a situation where it is unclear if the losses 
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suffered are direct or indirect losses, damages should be awarded according to 
whichever interpretation is stricter138. 
 
When it comes to the distinction between indirect and direct losses and its relation to 
assessing a party’s alleged negligence, there are two rulings of the Finnish Supreme 
Court that provide insight into the matter. The first one is from the year 1997. 
 
This case is about washers that were used as parts for conductor rails. The importer 
of the washers, the seller, had delivered the washers to the buyer that had 
constructed conductor rails out of the washers and delivered the conductor rails to its 
customers.  
 
Shortly thereafter there had been a short-circuit at one of the buyer’s customer’s 
production facility. Upon further inspection it was discovered that several of the 
washers delivered by the seller had cracked and pieces that had cracked off a 
washer had caused the short-circuit. The buyer had reimbursed its customer’s losses 
due to the faulty washers and also had to inspect other conductor rails and replace 
faulty washers at its customers’ facilities. The buyer then sued the seller claiming 
damages for losses caused by these actions but not for acquiring new washers. The 
buyer also claimed that the washers were defective due to their lack of durability. 
 
The Court of Appeal of Helsinki agreed with the Circuit Court of Vantaa that this was 
an instance of the buyer choosing to subject itself to a lesser indirect loss in order to 
avoid greater direct loss, which cannot be interpreted against the interest of the buyer 
as section 67 (3) of the Finnish Sale of Goods Act provides. Therefore, the buyer had 
been awarded the full amount of damages it had claimed. The Finnish Supreme 
Court agreed that the washers were defective but overturned this ruling and found 
that the losses were losses due to damage to property other than the goods sold or 
other similar losses that are difficult to foresee described in section 67 (2) and, 
therefore, indirect losses. Only if the end product had been defective but physically 
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intact from the time it was constructed, was there even a question of whether the 
losses caused were direct or indirect. As the seller had not been negligent or made 
express warranties in the sense of section 40 (3) of the Finnish Sale of Goods Act, 
the buyer’s losses were not recoverable139. 
 
This case falls in line with the rule of interpreting the distinction between direct and 
indirect losses according to whichever interpretation is stricter. It also demonstrates 
the importance of good contract drafting, as compensation for inspecting and 
replacing products sold to a third party because the products are or have become 
defective due to defective parts bought is something that can be agreed on in the 
phase of contract drafting. 
 
A case, where a seller had given an express warranty that the goods sold, laminate, 
would be suitable to be used as packaging for products made of potatoes was 
brought before the Finnish Supreme Court in 2007. In this case, packaging the potato 
products with this laminate had led to a batch of the products being spoiled as the 
laminate was not suitable for this use.  
 
The buyer was seeking damages for various direct and indirect losses due to the 
defect in the laminate, including lost profits because the spoiled products could not 
be sold, reimbursements to consumers, shipping both the spoiled and replacement 
products, and costs for locating the defect. The Court of Appeal of Helsinki had found 
that the warranty given by the seller is the type of express warranty described in 
section 40 (3) of the Finnish Sale of Goods Act, and awarded the buyer all the 
damages it had claimed140. 
 
However, the Finnish Supreme Court found that for this provision to be applicable, 
the goods have to already exist and be specified as the contractual goods at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract. It is enough if it is specified that the contractual 
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goods are to be taken from a specified bunch of goods, but as the laminate had not 
yet been produced at the conclusion of the contract for it to be sold, the warranty 
given by the seller was not the express warranty described in section 40 (3) of the 
Finnish Sale of Goods Act. Instead, the Supreme Court found, that the losses caused 
to the buyer were due to the seller’s negligence because of the warranty given, and 
awarded the buyer all the damages it had claimed141. This ruling might seem 
formalistic, but since the travaux preparatoires of the Finnish Sale of Goods Act 
define the demand for the goods to conform to the express warranty as an opposite 
of the goods being damaged after the conclusion of the contract,142 it provides an 
important clarification to the correct interpretation the express warranty described in 
section 40 (3) of the Finnish Sale of Goods Act. 
 
6.3 Exemptions from damages 
 
A closer look at the Finnish Sale of Goods Act reveals that the CISG has been used 
as a model in its drafting phase143. Although the Finnish Sale of Goods Act was 
drafted for the legislative needs of domestic trade, there was a conscious effort from 
the Finnish legislators to avoid unnecessary differences between it and the CISG144.  
 
Taking this into consideration with the fact that the wordings of CISG article 79 (1) 
and section 27 (1) of the Finnish Sale of Goods Act are very much alike, it is clear 
that the similarities between these provisions are not merely lingual. The four-part 
requirement for an exempting impediment of CISG article 79 (1) is also confirmed by 
the travaux preparatoires of section 27 (1) of the Finnish Sale of Goods Act: the 
Finnish legislators name the causality requirement, the requirement for the 
impediment to be outside of the non-performing party’s control, the unforeseeability 
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requirement, and the unavoidability requirement as the requirements for an 
exemption from damages145. 
 
The causality requirement is defined by naming impediments, which would normally 
be grounds for an exemption from damages. Examples include an accident such as a 
fire or an explosion, a strike, and an import or export restriction. However, the mere 
existence of one of these events is not enough to be grounds for an exemption: the 
impediment has to hinder the performance of the contract. However, an absolute, 
objective impossibility to perform is not required146. This description, in its relative 
ambiguity, is in line with the causality requirement under the CISG. 
 
The requirement for the impediment to be outside of the non-performing party’s 
control is described by mentioning the concept of a sphere of control and by using 
examples. Circumstances resulting from actions of the non-performing party’s staff 
(except for general strikes or similar situations not specifically caused by the non-
performing party) are named as an example. Internal factors such as negligence, 
shortcomings in planning, organizing, administration or efficiency, and technical 
difficulties are also considered to be within a party’s sphere of control. It makes no 
difference whether any fault or negligence can be found in the non-performing party’s 
actions or not: the only significant factor is whether or not the cause of the 
impediment has fallen within the non-performing party’s sphere of control in theory147.  
 
A party’s sphere of control is set to be being very wide. All possible problems that are 
related to the party’s production and business operations, including the actions of 
third parties for which it is reasonable, such as subcontractors and separate third 
parties it uses to fulfill the contract, are seen to fall under the party’s sphere of 
control. External factors such as accidents, natural phenomena such as thunderbolts, 
storms, and floods, power outages, interruptions in road traffic, instances of 
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bankruptcy, and actions of authorities can fall outside of a party’s sphere of control. 
However, each instance must be evaluated to determine if the party could have 
overcome it or foreseen it at the time of the conclusion of the contract148. This 
definition of the requirement for the impediment to be outside of the non-performing 
party’s control provided by the Finnish Sale of Goods Act is very similar to the 
corresponding requirement of CISG article 79 (1). 
 
The Finnish Sale of Goods Act’s definition of the unforeseeability requirement is also 
very similar to the corresponding definition under the CISG. If, for example, a 
normally exempting impediment such as a general strike or an import or export 
restriction has been foreseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract, these 
impediments are not exempting149. The unforeseeability requirement has also been 
confirmed by the Finnish Supreme Court both when applying the Finnish Sale of 
Goods Act and the general sales principles from before it had come to force150. 
 
The ruling to which the Finnish Sale of Goods Act was applied considers a situation 
between two natural persons, where a car racing hobbyist had sold a racing car and 
received a down payment. When the time had come for the rest of the purchase price 
to be paid, the buyer had not paid and a third person had informed the seller that the 
buyer had no intention to do so because he had not succeeded to receive funding. 
The seller had told the court that the buyer had been aware of his plan to continue 
with his car racing hobby, and, therefore, he knew or should have known the seller 
had planned to use the purchase price to pay for a new racing car. Because the 
seller had not received the purchase price from the buyer, he had had to make an 
agreement for additional time to pay for the new racing car he was buying, and this 
had meant he had to agree to a price increase for the new racing car. The seller had 
then sold the racing car the buyer had agreed to buy for a lesser price.  
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The Court of Appeal of Rovaniemi found that the buyer was liable to reimburse the 
seller for both the price difference between the price agreed by the seller and the 
buyer and the price increase of the new racing car even when the buyer was not 
aware which car the seller had intended to buy. The Finnish Supreme Court, 
however, overturned that ruling and found that the buyer was only liable for the 
decrease of the price received for the original racing car although the buyer should 
have known that the purchase price would be used to buy a new racing car. This is 
because the buyer had not had knowledge of the seller’s financial situation or the 
financing plans for the new racing car. The Supreme Court also hints at the 
unreasonability of the amount of the price increase in case the seller would be liable 
for it as the Supreme Court states that the price increase would be equal in amount 
to an overdue interest for the unpaid purchase price for approximately one and a half 
years151. 
 
This ruling is interesting for many reasons. Not only does the Finnish Supreme Court 
set the standard for foreseeability relatively high, as it can be expected that an 
average natural person does not possess the financial means to purchase a specialty 
vehicle, and because of this, as a natural person purchases a replacement vehicle 
for the one they sold and does not receiving funds from selling the old vehicle, this 
most likely leads to additional costs, but the Supreme Court also appears to make a 
statement on what is a reasonable amount for damages for additional costs due to 
the buyer’s failure to supply the purchase price. The interpretation on what is 
reasonably foreseeable for a party seems stricter than the one applied under the 
CISG. However, this is understandable as the CISG is not applicable to purchases 
for personal use. When parties making business related purchases are subjected to 
the reasonable person standard, the pictured average reasonable person has a 
higher level of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment than the one pictured 
when applying the reasonable person test to a natural person making purchases for 
personal use. 
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A notable connection between the unforeseeability requirement and the 
unavoidability requirement is also described in the travaux preparatoires of the 
Finnish Sale of Goods Act: when an impediment, which has been unforeseeable at 
the conclusion of the contract, becomes foreseeable before the delivery of the goods, 
the seller has to make arrangements to overcome the impediment when it is 
possible152. The travaux preparatoires also specify that although section 27 (1) of the 
Finnish Sale of Goods Act only mentions the consequences of the impediment as 
something the non-performing party should not have been able to reasonably avoid 
or overcome, the impediment itself should also fulfill the unavoidability 
requirement153. This requirement also strongly resembles the corresponding 
requirement under CISG article 79 (1). 
 
As a conclusion, the requirements for an exemption from damages under section 27 
(1) of the Finnish Sale of Goods Act are in line with the requirements for an 
exemption from damages under CISG article 79 (1). Therefore, when it came to the 
Finnish drafters seeing it necessary to vary from some CISG provisions in the 
interest of better serving the domestic trade, it is safe to say that the four-part 
requirement of CISG article 79 (1) was not one of the instances when such means 
were seen as necessary. Section 27 (1) of the Finnish Sale of Goods Act and CISG 
article 79 (1) can be described as relatively similar. 
 
6.4 Economic impediments and reasonability 
 
 
An exempting economic impediment is specifically described in the travaux 
preparatoires of section 27 (1) of the Finnish Sale of Goods Act: 
 
“Firstly, it is required that the delay is due to a circumstance, which 
hinders the timely performance of the contract. It is not enough that 
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performing the contract becomes more difficult or more expensive than 
expected. On the other hand, the provision contains no demands of a so-
called objective impossibility, in other words that the timely performance 
has become impossible to not only the seller but to any other person as 
well. Circumstances, which do not make the performance downright 
impossible, but exceptionally burdensome to the extent that they do 
objectively considering effectively prevent the contract from being 
fulfilled, can also sometimes be considered an impediment. On the other 
hand, other requirements set for an exemption from damages mean that 
only certain kinds of impediments can be successfully relied on in order 
to avoid liability for damages.  
 
- - - 
 
As previously stated, the seller cannot usually rely on the fact that 
fulfilling the contract has become more expensive than expected. 
However, under certain circumstances economic matters can also 
prevent the contract from being fulfilled. Even when the seller can be 
freed from the duty to fulfill the contract under section 23 on the grounds, 
that fulfilling the contract would demand sacrifices, which would be 
unreasonable compared to the benefit to the buyer from the seller 
fulfilling the contract, this does not necessarily mean that the seller is 
also exempted from damages. On the other hand, difficulties to perform 
and impediments are in essence usually economic. In many cases it is 
not the case that fulfilling the contract has become downright impossible, 
but rather that the expenses that would need to be sacrificed in order to 
overcome the occurred event or its consequences would clearly exceed 
what could objectively be seen as conceivable contribution to fulfill said 
contract.”154 
 
                                                 
154
 -"@"#$ 
59 
 
 
 
 
The former part strongly has a strong similarity to the causality requirement 
described in section 3.2.1 of this thesis. The description in the latter part clearly 
resembles the limit of sacrifice consideration described in section 5.2. The 
reasonability requirement is also acknowledged by the Finnish legislators in the latter 
part. However, similarly to the drafters of the CISG, the Finnish legislators do not 
define the exact requirements for exempting economic impediments, but leave it up 
to the Finnish courts to define them individually for each case. It can be said that the 
section 27 (1) of the Finnish Sale of Goods Act shares the weakest point of CISG 
article 79 (1) when it comes to interpreting economic impediments: vagueness. 
However, as the Finnish Sale of Goods Act is meant to be interpreted by Finnish 
legal professionals, this vagueness is not as dangerous as the CISG’s. This is 
because when there are interpreters from many very different legal backgrounds, it is 
much more likely that the interpretations are not coincident, which results in a 
decrease in predictability. When it comes to the Finnish Sale of Goods Act, the vast 
majority of relevant cases are ruled on by Finnish courts, and there is a chance to 
apply to a court of higher instance. In case of a wrong or unusual interpretation of 
Finnish law, there is chance to apply to the Finnish Supreme Court155, and as there is 
one court that ultimately makes the decisions on correct interpretation, wrong 
interpretations are very likely to get corrected and predictability attained. 
 
A requirement of reasonability is also expressed in section 70 (2) of the Finnish Sale 
of Goods Act. According to the provision, if the amount of damages claimed would be 
unreasonable when the possibilities of the breaching party to foresee and prevent the 
loss as well as other circumstances are taken into account, the amount of the 
damages can be adjusted to a more reasonable level. This requirement of 
reasonability was also one of the general sales and other principles of law applied 
already before the Finnish Sale of Goods Act came into force, especially as it was 
described in the Finnish Tort Liability Act, which came into force in the year 1972156.  
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The guidelines for evaluating reasonability in this sense are set in the travaux 
preparatoires of the Finnish Sale of Goods Act: 
 
“Whether and to which extend the damages should be adjusted has to 
be evaluated taking into account the circumstances of each case. 
Damages can be adjusted irrespective of whether they are due to direct 
or indirect loss. As is stated in the provision, an adjustment is possible 
primarily when it comes to loss, which has been difficult for the liable 
party to foresee and prevent. 
 
When an adjustment of damages is considered, among other things the 
nature of the contract of sale, who the parties are, the reason for the 
breach, the level of negligence and other actions of the breaching party, 
the actions of the party suffering the loss, the extend of the loss, and 
possible insurance policies taken and opportunities to take out insurance 
policies have to be taken into account. If the breach of contract is the 
result of gross negligence of the liable party, there are no grounds for an 
adjustment unless there are exceptional, very cogent reasons.”157  
  
 
The Finnish Supreme Court has found that in a case, where there was an increase of 
approximately 129 per cent in production costs of the goods sold and therefore, the 
contractual price would not even cover the price of the material needed for the 
goods, the contractual price was unreasonable to the extent that the court adjusted 
the amount of damages down by a third. The damages awarded by a Court of Appeal 
had the contractual price of the undelivered goods when the seller had refused to 
deliver the goods for the contractual price and the buyer had then purchased 
substituting goods. The price increase occurred because the market price of skim 
                                                 
157
 -"@"#$ 
61 
 
 
 
milk increased by 130 per cent due to a cancellation of a government subsidy for 
dairy products158.  
 
This ruling is interesting as the Finnish Supreme Court found that it would be 
unreasonable for the seller to bear the additional costs alone even when the parties 
had discussed the possibility of an increase in price due to governmental action as 
they had negotiated the contract. The District Court and the Court of Appeal had 
disagreed with the Supreme Court on the basis of the price increase not making it 
overwhelming for the seller to fulfill the contract.  
 
It has to be noted that the Finnish Supreme Court did not apply the Finnish Sale of 
Goods Act to this case as the case is from before the Finnish Sale of Goods Act 
came into force. The applicable law was the Finnish Code of Sales. However, the 
scope of the Finnish Code of Sales was very limited as it only had some very general 
rules for sales, and it was also badly outdated being from the year 1734. To deal with 
this situation, Finnish courts had developed a practice of applying general principles 
of sales. When it comes to the general principles of sales related to the reasonability 
analysis and setting the amount of damages in this ruling, the general principles of 
sales were very much coincident with the Finnish Sale of Goods Act (apart from 
damages due to indirect losses in the sale of non-specific goods, in which case the 
indirect losses were recoverable under the sales principles even when there was no 
negligence)159. 
 
This case is a good demonstration of the eagerness of Finnish courts to redistribute 
the contractual risk on grounds of reasonability even when the parties have agreed 
on the contractual risk allocation. This tendency to interpret section 70 (2) of the 
Finnish Sale of Goods Act very broadly is unfortunate as the principle of party 
autonomy is also an important aspect of the Finnish Sale of Goods Act. However, in 
the view of the Finnish legislators there is a problem with relatively unlimited party 
                                                 
158
 ==3F"$$ 
159
 -"@"#$ 
62 
 
 
 
autonomy, as the danger of a party misusing contractual freedom is present even 
when the parties are equals160.  
 
This view is overly protective. When two equal parties draft a contract and agree on 
the distribution of risk, their decision should be respected. The Finnish courts’ 
practice of redistributing the contractual risk seriously and unnecessarily threatens 
the parties’ right to freely conclude a contract and to trust in the binding nature of the 
contract they have concluded. The requirement for the damages awarded to be 
reasonable should be interpreted more similarly to article 79 (1) of the CISG: as a 
minimum level safety net in cases where one party is clearly in a weaker position 
than the other. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Both the reasoning behind introducing the CISG and the guidelines for its 
interpretation in unclear cases are relatively clear and easily obtainable. In spite of 
this, the missing consensus in interpreting the CISG, when not entirely surprising, is 
in parts based on clear misinterpretations and inadequate knowledge about 
international legal instruments. As legal education still mostly focuses on the national 
law of the educational institution, it is sadly still mostly up to individual legal 
professionals to educate themselves to reach the level needed to correctly apply the 
CISG or other international legal instruments. The relative unpopularity of the CISG is 
a logical consequence of the varying views: parties need predictability when it comes 
to interpreting their contracts and the applicable law. Therefore, battling the problem 
of the homeward trend is an important task if there is a wish for any international 
legal instruments to be a complete success without there being a specific court of last 
instance with an extensive jurisdiction to determine the instruments’ correct 
interpretation. The most obvious way to accomplish this would be to direct more 
attention to international legal instruments in legal education. 
 
When it comes to applying CISG article 79 (1) to economic impediments, the 
provision itself contains the reasonability requirement. Therefore, it cannot be 
overlooked when searching for tools for evaluating exempting economic 
circumstances. Since reasonability is not expressly defined in the CISG, underlying 
principles of the CISG are the primary source for a more precise meaning of the 
concept. The reasonable person test may also prove to be useful, and above all, 
party autonomy has to be respected if the parties have agreed on risk allocation or 
have contractual clauses on exemption. Known, established trade usages are 
considered an implied part of the contract between the parties and, therefore, have to 
also be taken into consideration in both the drafting phase of the contract and in the 
instance a non-performing party claims to be exempted due to an economic (or 
regular) impediment.  
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As it is generally advisable for parties to exert their party autonomy with precise 
contract drafting, parties should agree on risk allocation in their contractual 
relationship in a way, which provides them with additional predictability when it 
comes to assessing the lengths a party has to go in order to fulfill the contract. If this 
fails, in the very least applying the reasonability requirement when considering 
possible exempting economic impediments provides a level minimum protection to a 
weaker contractual party.  
 
 
